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I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the trading relationship 
between the United States and the People's Republic of China1 is 
its explosive growth over the last fifteen years. In 1973, the total 
value of bilateral trade between the U.S. and China was $805 mil-
lion (up from a mere $5 million just two years earlier).2 fo 1987, 
this figure reached $10.4 billion - an increase of over 1000 per 
cent.3 
This growth notwithstanding, the United States is not a com-
manding presence in the PRC's overall trade picture. The U.S. 
share of total PRC imports in 1986 (almost $43 billion) is only 7 .2 
percent, and the PRC accounted for only slightly over 1 percent of 
U.S. imports. 4 
Considering that the United States is the world's largest mar-
ket and that China, with over 1.1 billion people, has the world's 
largest population, there is clearly room for significant further 
growth in the bilateral trading relationship between the two 
countries. 
Much of this growth will undoubtedly occur in the technology 
sector. Since the announcement of the "Four Modernizations" in 
1978, Chinese economic policy has consistently emphasized the im-
* Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Washington, D.C. Formerly, Senior 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce. The authors gratefully ac-
knowledge the assistance of Ms. Maria Stamoulas, a 1988 summer associate at the Firm, in 
the preparation of this article. 
** Associate, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Washington, D.C. 
1. Hereinafter variously the People's Republic of China, the PRC or China. The Peo-
ple's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949, by Mao Zedong, Chairman of 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, 1987 U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights. 
3. Id. 
4. U.S. Department of Commerce. There is now a total of over $20 billion in foreign 
direct investment in China, of which only 14 percent is of U.S. origin. The largest source of 
investment in the PRC is Hong Kong, with total commitments, from 1979 through 1985, of 
over $10 billion (63.8 percent of the total). The U.S. is second with 13.1 percent, and Japan 
follows with total commitments during this period of $1.6 billion (9.8 percent of the total). 
The National Council for U.S.-China Trade, U.S. Joint Ventures in China: A Progress Re-
port (March 1987), at 106 [hereinafter Progress Report], 
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portance of technology in China's economic development. 6 The 
Chinese view technology as essential to the development of a mod-
ern society characterized by a rising standard of living, agricultural 
self-sufficiency, the ability to defend themselves and the ability to 
participate competitively in world markets. Technology transfer 
will therefore remain an attractive area of potential business in 
China for the foreseeable future. 
Despite the importance of technology transfer to the Chinese, 
this area of investment has been, and will continue to be, fraught 
with uncertainty. China's need to import technology, while pub-
licly recognized, has not always been matched by its ability to pay 
for it, as China has experienced chronic shortages of foreign ex-
change. China has measured its industrial property protection 
standards6 by the standards adopted by other developing coun-
tries, rather than those adopted by Western industrialized nations, 
tolerating deficiencies in the scope and quality of industrial prop-
erty protection that U.S. investors find troubling. 
China's laws regarding the importation of technology are com-
plex, and its governmental structure is large and cumbersome. 
Both have been characterized by constant evolution in recent 
years. As investments made earlier have begun to mature, some 
foreign investors have experienced difficulty in repatriating their 
profits in the face of stringent Chinese controls on foreign ex-
change remittances. 
These and other aspects of China's foreign investment climate 
have led to frustration and wariness on the part of current and 
potential investors alike and were at least partially responsible for 
the significant decline in investment flows to China that occurred 
during 1985 and 1986.7 
5. In March, 1978, shortly after the Four Modernizations were announced, then-Pre-
mier Deng Xiaopeng stated: "The crux of the four modernizations is the mastery of science 
and technology. Without modern science and technology, it is impossible to build modern 
agriculture, modern industry or modern defense." Progress Report, supra note 4, at 8. 
6. As used in this article, "industrial property" refers to intellectual property, whether 
or not patentable, used in a business. It includes intellectual property that provides a com-
petitive advantage and that is secret (i.e., trade secrets) but does not include copyrights and 
trademarks. 
7. Total U.S. investment in China fell from $1.1 billion in 1985 to $528 million in 1986. 
Progress Report, supra note 4, at 103. However, the Progress Report suggests that other 
factors - such as a world decline in oil prices resulting in significant cutbacks in natural 
resource exploration and development - may also explain this decrease and notes official 
Chinese figures showing that "the number of newly signed U.S. equity joint ventures rose 
from 76 in 1985 to 81 in 1986 and that the commitments to these equity joint ventures more 
than doubled, rising from $130 million in 1985 to $263 million in 1986." Id. at 105. 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1989], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol15/iss2/2
1989] Technology Transfer 143 
The Chinese have reacted to these concerns in a variety of 
ways. They have expanded and improved protection of industrial 
property by enactment of a Chinese patent law and the promulga-
tion of amplifying regulations. They have attempted to upgrade 
and improve the regulatory and legal framework for foreign invest-
ment generally, gradually opening up and rendering more trans-
parent the legal and administrative procedures through which in-
vestment commitments are made and protected. And, as 
investments have multiplied and become more complex, the Chi-
nese have demonstrated a willingness to address new problems as 
they arise. 
There remain, however, significant problems for the foreign in-
vestor. The Chinese bureaucracy remains opaque to the outsider. 
The legal environment is unfamiliar and unclear with respect to 
both substantive law and legal remedies and the role of Chinese 
courts in enforcing those remedies. Problems with industrial prop-
erty protection persist, and uncertainties remain regarding China's 
ability to sustain and assimilate high levels of foreign investment. 
This article will summarize the steps taken since 1978 to open 
China to foreign investment and provide a stable legal environ-
ment. It will discuss recent developments affecting that climate 
and assess problems likely to be encountered by foreign investors 
in the transfer of technology to Chinese entities. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT SINCE 1978 
With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the PRC abruptly en-
tered a new political and economic era. The new leadership, recog-
nizing that the Cultural Revolution had caused economic stagna-
tion and economic isolation, moved quickly to alter course. In 
1978, then-Party Chairman Hua Guofeng announced the initiation 
of the "Four Modernizations" (industry, agriculture, defense and 
science and technology). Underlying the Four Modernizations was 
the recognition by the leadership of the major role that foreign in-
vestment would be called upon to play in the transformation of 
China into a twentieth-century economy. In 1978, then-Premier 
Deng Xiaopeng also announced China's "Open Door" Policy of 
promoting investment in, and trade with, the PRC. In the follow-
ing year, China entered into a comprehensive reciprocal trade 
agreement with the United States (just a few years earlier, such a 
step would have been unthinkable) that opened up vast new pros-
3
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pects for increased economic relations between the two countries. 8 
In 1979, the central government also began a series of aggres-
sive economic experiments in a number of coastal provinces and 
cities that were intended to encourage foreign investment while 
moving away from rigid state control of the economy.9 The Special 
Economic Zones and Economic and Technological Development 
Zones were converted into test-tube economies in order to deter-
mine what mixes of deregulation and investment incentives might 
offer the best prospects for the country at large. Many of the most 
successful of those experiments have since been implemented at 
the national level. 
The effort to attract foreign investment produced results: by 
the end of 1986, foreign investors owned, wholly or in part, 7, 738 
enterprises in the PRC.10 However, as the Chinese economy be-
came more complex and the number and variety of foreign invest-
ments in the PRC multiplied, the lack of a legal structure capable 
of providing an orderly framework for economic relations grew 
more obvious.11 
Much of the corpus of Chinese law - and the government in-
frastructure trained to administer and interpret it - had been oblit-
erated during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, economic rela-
tions with the Western world had been so limited that many 
government officials, both at the national and provincial level, had 
little or no experience in negotiating with western investors. Chi-
nese officials (as well as prospective Chinese investment partners) 
had little understanding of the issues that were of critical impor-
tance to foreign investors or the substantive provisions of Chinese 
law that might govern those issues outside the contract. 
Contract negotiations were typically carried on by reference to 
8. Trade Relations Agreement between the United States of America and the People's 
Republic of China, July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.l.A.S. No. 9630 [hereinafter the U.S.-
China Trade Agreement]. Since 1978, the PRC has established trade relations with over 176 
countries and signed trade agreements or protocols with 94 countries. See generally Horsley, 
The Regulation of China's Foreign Trade, FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 5 (M. Moser ed. 1987)[hereinafter Horsley]. 
9. Notable among these were the establishment of Special Economic Zones in the cities 
of Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and the city of Xiamen in Fujian 
Province as well as the establishment of Economic and Technological Development Zones in 
fourteen coastal cities, principally Dalian, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Tianjin. See E. Pow & 
M. Moser, Law and Investment in China's Special Investment Areas, FOREIGN TRADE, IN-
VESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 199 (M. Moser ed. 1987) [here-
inafter Moser]. 
10. H.R. ZHENG, CHINA'S CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW 232 (1988) [hereinafter ZHENG]. 
11. Id. at 46. 
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forms of draft contracts and to form contractual provisions. Al-
though the forms utilized were based largely on established inter-
national contract rules and procedures, 12 Chinese negotiators ap-
parently agreed only rarely to contractual provisions that departed 
from or were otherwise inconsistent with the forms used as negoti-
ating texts. Their reluctance to do so may probably be ascribed to 
their lack of understanding of the issues presented as well as, per-
haps, bureaucratic and ideological impediments. 
The reluctance on the part of the Chinese to agree to contrac-
tual provisions regarding any issue not addressed in contract forms 
proved unsatisfactory for many foreign investors, since it left them 
without contractual protection on many issues of importance to 
them.13 
The PRC has recognized and responded to these shortcom-
ings. Since 1979, the Chinese have promulgated a steady flow of 
national laws14 and regulationsu intended to encourage foreign in-
vestment and to provide a stable and predictable legal climate. 
The Joint Venture Law (1979) established the "equity joint ven-
ture" as the favored vehicle for foreign investment in China. The 
Economic Contract Law (1981) codified national principles of con-
tract law among Chinese entities. The Foreign-Related Economic 
Contract Law (1985), which conformed in many respects to inter-
nationally accepted contract norms (such as they are), established 
governing principles for contracts with foreign entities. The Chi-
nese Patent Law (1985) and Trademark Law (1983) provided pro-
tection for intellectual property. And the Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprise Law (1986) offered, for the first time, national statutory 
recognition of foreign entities involving no Chinese participation. 
Most recently, the Contractual Joint Venture Law (1988) has ere- · 
ated a legal framework for the formation and operation of contrac-
12. Id. at 47. 
13. Id. at 48. 
14. The legislative process leading to the enactment of legislation in the PRC varies 
with the subject matter and perceptions of the importance of the legislation to the State. 
The National People's Congress (NPC), which, under the Constitution adopted in 1982, is 
the PRC's highest legislative body, meets once each year and approves legislation affecting 
"basic laws in such areas as criminal law, civil law, and laws on state institutions." Id. at 6. 
The Standing Committee of the NPC, however, also has the power under the 1982 Constitu-
tion "to enact and revise laws other than those that must be enacted by the [NPC]." Id. at 
7. The State Council is the Executive branch of the government, id. at 8, but, under Article 
89 of the Constitution, has the power to enact "administrative laws and regulations'', as well 
as decisions and decrees. Id. Each of these three bodies has played a major role in the 
reconstruction of the PRC's legal fabric since 1978. 
15. Id. at 5 n.25. 
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tual joint ventures.18 
The Chinese have also taken a number of significant other 
steps to join the international community of trading nations. China 
joined the Customs Cooperation Council in 1983 and became a sig-
natory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property in 1984. In 1983, in order to provide for continued growth 
in its textile exports, China became a party to the Multifiber Ar-
rangement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT") and, in 1986, formally applied for readmission to the 
GATT.11 
China's internal trade policies have also undergone rapid and 
continuous change. In conjunction with the initiation of the Open 
Door policy in 1979, the national government delegated to provin-
cial and regional authorities much of its responsibility for decisions 
regarding foreign investment. Subsequently, however, the degree of 
national control over such decisions (and the requirements im-
posed on foreign investors as a precondition of government ap-
proval of their investments) has fluctuated, principally as a result 
of concerns regarding foreign exchange and cycles of the Chinese 
economy.18 
In 1982, the government formed a new Ministry of Foreign 
and Economic-Related Trade ("MOFERT"),19 which has since 
emerged as the preeminent government organ for the approval of 
foreign investment and technology transfer contracts. New laws al-
ternately regulating and encouraging foreign investment in various 
16. Chinese statutes and regulations enacted at the national level during this period 
number over two hundred, ranging in subject matter from bankruptcy to worker rights, any 
one of which may affect a foreign investor depending on whether a Chinese entity is created, 
the nature of that entity and the jurisdiction in which the entity is established or operations 
are conducted. See ZHENG, supra note 10, at xxxiii. 
17. China was one of the original 23 contracting parties to the GA TT in 194 7. Following 
establishment of the People's Republic, China permitted its membership to lapse. 
From the standpoint of intellectual property protection, China's application for mem-
bership in the GATT is especially significant. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, 
announced in Punta Del Este, Uruguay in October, 1986, will include discussions of new 
international standards for the protection of intellectual property. China has participated as 
an observer in the Uruguay Round and at the time this paper was prepared planned to 
attend the GATT ministerial mid-term review to be held in Montreal during December, 
1988. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1988, at D17, col. 1 (late city final ed.). 
18. See generally Horsley, supra note 8. 
19. MOFERT was formed by the merger of the preexisting Ministries of Trade and 
Foreign Economic Relations, the Foreign Investment Commission and the State Import-
Export Commission. Chwang & Thurston, Technology . Takes Command: the Policy of the 
People's Republic of China with Respect to Technology Transfer and Protection of Intel-
lectual Property, 21 INT'L L. 129, 135 n.34 (Winter 1987) [hereinafter Chwang & Thurston]. 
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forms have followed each other at regular intervals, as China has 
continuously revised its approach to foreign investment based on 
its experience and evolving priorities. 
The following materials describe the most significant of 
China's current laws and regulations, first in the context of forms 
of doing business available to the foreign investor (section Ill), 
then in the context of the legal environment in which these entities 
operate (section IV). Section V contains a brief discussion of Chi-
nese patent law and protections available for trade secrets. 
III. LAWS GOVERNING FORMS OF INVESTMENT: EQUITY JOINT 
VENTURES, CONTRACTUAL JOINT VENTURES AND WHOLLY FOREIGN-
0WNED ENTERPRISES 
Since 1978, foreign investment in the PRC has taken three 
principal forms: "equity joint ventures," "contract joint ventures" 
and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. The development of Chinese 
law governing each of these principal business forms is briefly de-
scribed below. 
A. Equity Joint Ventures 
The so-called "equity joint venture"20 was the first foreign-in-
vestment vehicle permitted by the Chinese government in the 
post-Mao era and historically has been the vehicle favored by the 
Chinese for acquiring Western technology. The Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and For-
eign lnvestment21 and its Implementing Regulations22 were in-
tended to create an environment of legal certainty for foreign 
investors. Equity joint ventures continue to operate in a legal envi-
ronment that is more comprehensive and well-developed than that 
available to any other investment form in China. 
This environment offers certain advantages to the foreign in-
vestor. For example, under the Joint Venture Law and Implement-
20. The term "equity joint venture" does not appear in the Joint Venture Law (see 
infra note 21) or its Implementing Regulations (see infra note 22) and is not defined else-
where in Chinese statutory law (although it does appear in the Technology Transfer Regula-
tions (see infra note 105)). 
21. Adopted on July 1, 1979, at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Con-
gress and promulgated July 8, 1979 [hereinafter the Joint Venture Law]. 
22. Implementing Regulations for the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint 
Ventures using Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by the State Council on Sep-
tember 20, 1983, transl. in China Economic News, Suppl. 4, October 3, 1983 [hereinafter the 
Implementing Regulations]. · 
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ing Regulations, equity joint ventures are considered to be Chinese 
legal persons28 and should not, in theory, operate at a disadvantage 
due to foreign ownership in their legal and economic relations with 
the government and other Chinese entities. The liability of partici-
pants in equity joint ventures is limited to their respective invest-
ments, 24 a concept that U.S. investors, accustomed to limited-lia-
bility concepts, find attractive. In addition, under various 
regulations promulgated at both the national and provincial levels 
to encourage the formation of equity joint ventures, such entities 
receive valuable tax incentives that are generally unavailable to 
other forms of investment.25 By the end of 1986, over 3200 equity 
joint ventures had been formed in China,26 of which 219 involved 
U.S. parties.27 
The very certainty that the Chinese created in order to en-
courage foreign investment has, however, also operated to create a 
degree of inflexibility that many foreign investors find troubling. 
While the legal requirements for the establishment of equity joint 
ventures are well-established, they are also rigid. For example, the 
Chinese have imposed significant capital requirements on partici-
pants in equity joint ventures (e.g., up to seventy percent of the 
total investment must take the form of equity; borrowed funds 
may not be used to meet capitalization requirements).28 
23. Id. art. 2. Although the term "Chinese legal person" is not defined in the Joint 
Venture Law or the Implementing Regulations, the subsequently enacted General Principles 
of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, promulgated April 6, 1986, by the Sixth 
National People's Congress [hereinafter the Civil Code] define the term "legal person" as 
"an organization that possesses capacity to acquire civil rights and competence to perform 
civil acts, and that, according to the law, may independently assume rights and bear civil 
liability." Civil Code art. 36. 
This definition appears to extend to collectively and State-owned enterprises, id. art. 
41; contractual joint ventures upon approval and registration, id.; and wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, id. See also Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-owned 
Enterprises, infra note 83, art. 8. 
24. Joint Venture Law, supra note 21, art. 4. See also the discussion of limitations on 
the liability of other entities at note 52, infra. 
25. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Sino-Foreign Joint Ven-
tures, promulgated September 10, 1980, by the National People's Congress and revised on 
September 2, 1983, by the Standing Committee [hereinafter the Joint Venture Income Tax 
Law], provides that an equity joint venture with a term of ten years or more is exempt from 
income taxes for the first two years in which it has income that would otherwise be taxable 
and is exempt from 50 per cent of the otherwise applicable tax for the following three years. 
Joint Venture Income Tax Law art. 5, as revised. See generally ZHENG, supra note 10, at 
273. 
26. See ZHENG, supra note 10, at 273. 
27. Progress Report, supra note 4, at 98. 
28. The Implementing Regulations require that joint ventures with a total investment 
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In addition, the Joint Venture Law requires that the foreign 
investment be a minimum of 25 percent of the total capital in-
vested in the enterprise. 29 Although in general this may not cause 
difficulty (historically most equity joint ventures have had 50:50 or 
49:51 foreign-to-local investment ratios),80 it may restrict some 
marginal investment and, if Chinese private entities increase in 
size, prevent the formation of joint ventures in which the foreign 
contribution would not optimally constitute 25 percent of the 
venture. 
The Joint Venture Law, as implemented, places numerous re-
strictions on the ability of foreign equity joint venture parties to 
make their contributions in kind. Article 28 of the Implementing 
Regulations, for example, provides that machinery or other equip-
ment proposed as a capital contribution must be "indispensable" 
to production and unavailable in China under commercially rea-
sonable terms and may not be valued (for purposes of calculating 
the foreign party's contributions) at a level that is higher than the 
"international price" for similar items. 
Similar restrictions apply to contributions of "industrial prop-
erty rights" and "proprietary intellectual property." For example, 
such rights and property must foster either (1) "the production of 
new products that China urgently needs or products suitable for 
export;" (2) marked improvements in either the quality of existing 
products or manufacturing productivity; or (3) "marked conver-
sion" of energy or raw materials.81 Extensive documentation is re-
quired of the contributor's rights to or ownership of industrial 
property or rights, 32 and the Chinese government reserves the right 
to examine and approve the contribution of any property that is 
proposed for contribution by the foreign joint venturer.88 
The Implementing Regulations also impose a number of re-
strictions on agreements negotiated between equity joint ventures 
and suppliers of technology. Although they apply to all technology 
of up to $3 million be capitalized at seventy percent of the total investment. Joint ventures 
with a total investment of from $3 million to $10 million must be capitalized at fifty per-
cent. The capitalization percentage declines to forty percent for investments totaling from 
$10 million to $30 million and to thirty percent for investments totaling in excess of $30 
million. M. Moser, Foreign Investment in China: The Legal Framework, in Moser, supra 
note 9, at 106. 
29. Joint Venture Law, supra note 21, art. 4. 
30. ZHENG, supra note 10, at 260. 
31. Joint Venture Law, supra note 21, art. 5. 
32. Id. art. 29. 
33. Id. art. 30. 
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importations by joint ventures, these restrictions are presumably 
intended principally to control arrangements in which the foreign 
party to a joint venture also serves as a supplier of technology to 
the venture and to prevent exploitation by such suppliers at the 
expense of the Chinese party to the venture. For example, the Im-
plementing Regulations require that imported technology be "ap-
propriate and advanced, enabling the resulting products to display 
marked social and economic results domestically, or to have com-
petitive capacity on the international market."34 
All import agreements must be examined and approved by the 
appropriate approval authority;H tie-in arrangements and export 
restrictions on the resulting products are prohibited;36 prices, li-
cense fees or royalties must be fair and reasonable. 37 
Perhaps most significantly, the Implementing Regulations ex-
pressly limit the term of any technology licensing arrangement to 
ten years and provide that, after termination, the Chinese party 
may continue to use the technology. 38 Thus, in many practical re-
spects, the foreign supplier is engaged in a sales transaction rather 
than a licensing arrangement. 
The Joint Venture Law requires that profits be allocated to 
the parties in proportion to their investment39 and that profits be 
distributed in currency.•0 These restrictions serve a dual purpose. 
First, the prospects for the survival of the venture are enhanced by 
the long-term commitment of each party; neither is able to place 
the other at a disadvantage by recouping his investment more rap-
idly than the other. Second, the products produced by the venture 
must be either sold in China or exported as part of a transaction 
involving foreign exchange; the foreign partner is not permitted to 
accept, as his share of the profits, goods produced by the venture 
that he can then resell in other markets at an additional profit. 
Finally, the Joint Venture Law specifies that agreements and 
contracts creating equity joint ventures shall be governed by Chi-
nese law.41 
There are two immediate drawbacks to the governing law pro-
34. Id. art. 44. 
35. Id. art. 46. 
36. Id. arts. 46.6, 46.2. 
37. Id. art. 46.1. 
38. Id. arts. 46.3, 46.4. 
39. Id. art. 7. 
40. Id. 
41. Implementing Regulations, supra note 22, art. 15. 
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vision of the Joint Venture Law. First, it means that the agreement 
of the parties will be subject to China's Economic Contract Law, 
because the entity formed pursuant to the joint venture is consid-
ered a Chinese legal person. •2 As a statute intended to reflect and 
implement the goals of the governing State Plan,•3 the Economic 
Contract Law may not treat the obligations of the parties in a neu-
tral way. Second, this provision deprives the foreign investor of the 
opportunity to graft any other provisions of law onto the deal. 0 
The application of Chinese law can be troubling for the for-
eign investor in other ways. Much of the published law is of rela-
tively recent vintage and may not be fully implemented or under-
stood at all levels of the Chinese government. Also, many "laws" 
are unpublished internal regulations known only to government of-
ficials. As one commentator has indicated, 
Most of these internal rules consist of directives which must 
be followed by Chinese negotiators in interpreting and implement-
ing statutory laws. Some herald the introduction of new policies .. 
. others are simply a formalization of [previous] practices . . . 
[!]internal rules complicate the elucidation and definition of 
China's legal system and . . . pose constant pitfalls in the way of 
attempts to understand the nature and operation of the rules regu-
lating commercial transactions. 0 
The restrictions of the Joint Venture Law may give pause to a 
foreign investor wary of long-term economic entanglements and 
unfamiliar with the Chinese legal environment. An investor who 
owns technology or know-how that represents a substantial re-
source commitment and that constitutes an appropriate contribu-
tion-in-kind to a joint venture may wish to keep his front-end ex-
penses to a minimum, want a relatively high rate of early return 
and be interested in taking advantage of low Chinese labor wage 
rates to produce a product that is price-competitive in third 
markets. 
Such an investor may be willing to operate in a less well-estab-
lished legal environment than that afforded by the Joint Venture 
42. Id.; See supra note 23, and accompanying text. 
43. The developments summarized in Part I notwithstanding, China's remains funda-
mentally a planned economy. Five-year State Plans establish economic and investment poli-
cies as well as priorities for the implementation of those policies. The Sixth State Plan was 
initiated by the Sixth National People's Congress in 1986. 
44. See H. Zheng, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China: a 1986 
Update, 19 N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L L. & PoL. 269 (1986-87) [hereinafter Zheng II]. 
45. Moser, supra note 9, at 3. · 
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Law in order to gain greater flexibility in structuring his invest-
ment. This may explain why, from the promulgation of the Joint 
Venture Law in 1979 to the end of 1986, only slightly over 3,200 
equity joint ventures were formed, as compared to over 4,300 con-
tractual joint ventures during roughly the same period. 46 
B. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 
On April 13, 1988, the new Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures came into 
being. 47 Although, as indicated above, contractual joint ventures 
are the preponderant form of foreign investment in the PRC (in 
terms both of the number of investments made and of total dollars 
committed)48 the contract joint venture was, until promulgation of 
the new law, the only major investment vehicle with respect to 
which no law at the national level had been developed. 49 
The absence of a national law governing the formation and op-
eration of contractual joint ventures - and uncertainty as to the 
form such a law, if promulgated, might take - had been a growing 
source of concern to potential investors. Promulgation of the Con-
tractual Joint Venture Law fills a large gap in the law of China 
governing foreign investment. The Chinese undoubtedly intended 
that the new law provide a far more certain legal environment for 
contractual joint ventures than had previously existed. 
1. Pre-1988 Experience 
Contractual joint venturers have historically operated in a le-
gal environment governed almost entirely by contract. The most 
appealing aspect of contractual joint venture operations for the 
46. ZHENG, supra note 10, at 234. The number of contractual joint ventures formed 
through 1987 is reported to have risen to slightly over 5,000. See China Economic News, 
Apr. 25, 1988, at 1, col. 1. 
For the period 1979 through 1985, total investment committed to equity joint ventures 
in China exceeded $3.4 billion, while commitments to contractual joint ventures exceeded 
$8.2 billion. See Progress Report, supra note 4, at 101. 
47. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint 
Ventures, adopted by the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 
13, 1988, effective on the date of promulgation, transl. in China Daily (Beijing), Apr. 13, 
1988 [hereinafter the Contractual Joint Venture Law]. 
48. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
49. An exception is the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Exploita-
tion of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises, promulgated 
January 30, 1982, by the State Council. See ZHENG, supra note 10, at 234. 
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foreign investor has been the flexibility afforded by contractual ar-
rangements and the lack of rigid constraints such as those imposed 
by the Joint Venture Law. Parties wishing to forego the legal cer-
tainty offered by the Joint Venture Law have been able to struc-
ture their investments much as they pleased, consistent with the 
necessity of government approval. Thus, some contractual joint 
venturers have formed new Chinese entities to carry on the ven-
ture under the Joint Venture Law, while others have elected not to 
do so, instead choosing to operate within the framework of their 
own unique legal regime. 
Major financial arrangements, such as the amount, form and 
timing of investments by the parties, the term of the venture, the 
form in which profits will be distributed and the allocation of prof-
its (as well as the schedule on which they will be distributed) are 
each subject to such contractual provisions as the parties may 
agree to, provided that the contract meet~ the approval of the ap-
propriate authorities. 
For example, a foreign investor might agree to contribute tech-
nology and know-how, while his Chinese partner contributes real 
property and a labor pool. The share of each partner need not be 
linked to a third party valuation of his contribution (there is no 
minimum equity percentage, as in the case of equity joint ven-
tures) but may freely be negotiated based on the parties' own as-
sessment of the value to the enterprise of each other's 
contribution. 
The contractual arrangements may permit one party, during 
the early years of the venture, to take out profits at a rate dispro-
portionate to his initial investment, thus recovering his investment 
more quickly than the other. Such arrangements are particularly 
attractive to the foreign investor. Moreover, the payout of a con-
tractual joint venture - unlike that of an equity joint venture -
may be in the form of goods that the foreign investor is free to 
export and sell in a third market, thus increasing his economic re-
turn. The parties are also free to negotiate other issues bearing on 
their economic relationship, for example, the law under which dis-
putes may be resolved, remedies for breach and duties in mitiga-
tion. None of these features (with the possible exception of the 
first) is available to the equity joint venturer. 
The Chinese investor may, it should be noted, be quite com-
fortable with such arrangements; he benefits from access to foreign 
technology without the necessity of buying it, and typically (as in 
the case of equity joint ventures) he will own the technology out-
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right when the term of the venture expires, with the prospect of 
indefinite use of the technology thereafter. 50 
The contractual joint venture form is, however, not without 
disadvantages. As with the equity joint venture, contractual joint 
ventures have been subject to lengthy and uncertain approval re-
quirements based on the value of the contract and the aims of the 
venture. While the liability of the parties to an equity joint venture 
is expressly limited to the assets of the venture,51 the liability of 
contractual joint venturers may not always be limited. Limited lia-
bility will depend on whether a new Chinese entity is formed pur-
suant to the joint venture contract, and whether this entity quali-
fies as a Chinese legal person under the applicable provisions of 
the Civil Code. 52 
The chief disadvantages of the contractual joint venture have 
been its uncertain legal status and the lack of an established legal 
framework upon which contractual joint venturers could rely. Pro-
mulgation of the new Contractual Joint Venture Law reflects an 
effort to remove these disadvantages and thus should be a source 
of reassurance to foreign investors. 
2. Basic Features of the Contractual Joint Venture Law 
As with the earlier-enacted Joint Venture Law53 and Foreign 
Enterprise Law,54 the Contractual Joint Venture Law is intended 
only to establish a minimal legal framework for contractual joint 
ventures and will be followed by the issuance of more detailed im-
50. Although contractual joint ventures are not subject to the restrictions governing the 
importation of technology that are imposed on equity joint ventures through the Imple-
menting Regulations, (see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text), Chinese parties are 
aware of those provisions and will generally insist on the right to retain and use licensed 
technology after the term of the license expires. 
In addition, Chinese regulations governing contracts for the import of technology will 
generally apply to such arrangements. These regulations contain a provision similar to that 
of the Implementing Regulations (see infra text section III. D). 
51. See supra note 24. 
52. In addition to the requirements of Article 36 of the Civil Code (see supra note 23 
and accompanying text), Article 37 of the Civil Code requires that legal persons (1) be law-
fully established, (2) possess the necessary property or funds, (3) possess their own name, 
organizational structure and place of business and ( 4) be able to assume civil liability inde-
pendently. Civil Code art. 37 
Article 48 of the Civil Code provides that the liability of entities doing business as 
Chinese legal persons is limited to the value of their assets; thus qualification as a Chinese 
legal person appears to be key to establishing limited liability. Id. art. 48. 
53. See Joint Venture Law, supra note 21. 
54. See Foreign Enterprise Law, infra note 83. 
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plementing regulations.66 However, the Contractual Joint Venture 
Law appears to codify much of the present governmental policy 
and practice and appears intended to reassure potential investors 
that the government will continue to permit a degree of flexibility 
in contractual arrangements for this form of investment that is un-
available to equity joint ventures. 
The law's stated purpose is "to expand economic cooperation 
and technical exchange with foreign countries and to promote the 
joint establishment, on the principle of mutual equality and bene-
fit ... of Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures within the ter-
ritory of China" (emphasis added).66 It offers a guarantee that 
"[t]he State shall protect the lawful rights and interests of contrac-
tual joint ventures and of the Chinese and foreign parties"67 and 
that "[t]he right of a contractual joint venture to make its own 
operational and managerial decisions shall not be interfered 
with."68 
The Contractual Joint Venture Law confirms that foreign and 
Chinese contractual joint venturers enjoy great flexibility (subject, 
of course, to government approval) in structuring the form and 
value of their contributions and the allocation, distribution and 
form of revenues. It provides that the joint venturers may provide 
by contract for "the investment or conditions for cooperation, the 
distribution of earnings or products, the sharing of risks and losses, 
the manner of operation and management and the ownership of 
the property at the time of termination. . . "69 The law provides 
that the contribution of the investors to the venture "may be pro-
vided in cash or in kind, or may include the right to the use of 
land, industrial property rights, nonpatent [sic] technology, and 
other property rights."60 It further provides that the investors may 
"distribute earnings or products [and] undertake risks and losses" 
in whatever fashion they agree to by contract61 and guarantees that 
foreign earnings from the venture, as well as salaries or "other le-
55. Article 27 of the Contractual Joint Venture Law provides that implementing regula-
tions shall be formulated by MOFERT, subject to the approval of the State Council. At the 
time this article was prepared, implementing regulations were not expected to be published 
prior to January 1, 1989. Conversation with Kelly Ho Shea, United States-China Business 
Council (Washington, D.C.), September 28, 1988. 
56. Contractual Joint Venture Law, supra note 47, art. 1. 
57. Id. art. 3. 
58. Id. art. 11. 
59. Id. art. 2. 
60. Id. art. 8. 
61. Id. art. 22. 
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gitimate income" of foreign participants, may be repatriated after 
payment of any taxes. 62 
The Joint Venture Law also confirms past practice in that it 
permits contractual joint venturers to wind up their affairs in 
whatever way they see fit. For example, upon termination of the 
venture, they may choose to allocate hard assets such as real estate 
and improvements to the Chinese party and other assets, such as 
cash on hand, inventory and receivables to the foreign party.63 
Likewise, the law ensures continuation of past policies permitting 
foreign investors to begin recouping their initial investment prior 
to the termination of the venture.6" This recoupment may, for ex-
ample, take the form of a disproportionate share of revenues 
which, as noted above, may be repatriated or moved abroad after 
payment of appropriate taxes or may be in the form of products 
which the investor may dispose of in third markets. The law also 
confirms that, as in the past, investors in contractual joint ventures 
have a choice as to whether to form a new Chinese legal entity and 
clarifies that, if a new entity is formed, it may qualify as a Chinese 
legal person. 66 
The Joint Venture Law assures a continued high degree of 
flexibility in arranging the management structure of the venture. It 
confirms that the foreign investor or its designee may serve as the 
chairman of the required board or "joint management institu-
tion,"66 provided that, if a foreigner so serves, a Chinese must be 
designated as the second in command. 67 The option of placing a 
foreigner in overall charge of the venture is not clearly available to 
equity joint venturers. 
3. Issues Unresolved 
Although foreign investors have some assurance that the basic 
policy of the Chinese government toward contractual joint ven-
tures will continue, the new law is quite vague on a number of is-
sues that undoubtedly are of significance to any investment 
decision. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. art. 2. 
66. Id. art. 12. 
67. Id. 
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a. Management Alternatives 
The Joint Venture Law is ambiguous regarding the manage-
ment structures that are available to the joint venturers and the 
extent to which the choice of structure is dependent upon whether 
a new entity is formed pursuant to the joint venture. 
While the new law clearly permits the contractual joint ven-
ture to have either a "board of directors" or a "joint managerial 
institution" (the venture must have one or the other),68 it is silent 
regarding the range of possibilities encompassed by the joint man-
agerial institution and contains no detail regarding important is-
sues such as the number of members of the board or joint manage-
rial institution, the method of their selection and replacement, 
meeting requirements, voting rights and other issues typically ad-
dressed by U.S. corporate by-laws. 
Although the law does contemplate the preparation and ap-
proval by the government of "articles of association" (in which the 
above and related issues may presumably be addressed),69 it places 
no apparent restrictions on the manner in which this step is to be 
accomplished. This raises a number of questions for which there 
are no ready answers. For example, who among the members of the 
joint managerial institution is capable of binding the venture 
contractually? 
The law is also ambiguous regarding whether the management 
structure selected by the joint venturers is dependent on whether 
they elect to form a new Chinese legal entity. Article 12 of the law 
may be read, for example, to permit the formation of a board of 
directors only if the parties elect to form a new Chinese legal en-
tity and to reserve "joint managerial institutions" for other con-
tractual joint ventures. 
b. Degree of Operational Authority 
The degree of operational authority available to the governing 
structure ultimately selected is also unclear. The board or joint 
management institution "shall, according to the contract or the ar-
ticles of association ... , decide on the major issues concerning the 
venture." (emphasis added)70 What is meant by the term "major 
issues?" Is this provision intended as a broad - or specifically lim-
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
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ited - grant of authority? 
The law permits the board or joint management body to "de-
cide on the appointment or employment of a general manager who 
shall take charge of the daily operation and management of the 
contractual joint venture. "71 The law does not require this step, 
however, thus leaving open the possibility that daily operational 
decisions may in fact be made by the board or joint management 
body of the venture. 
c. Status as Limited Liability Company 
As noted previously, the ability of contractual joint ventures 
to limit their liability has traditionally been a function of the abil-
ity of newly formed entities to qualify as Chinese legal persons. 
The new law makes it clear that this continues to be the case. Arti-
cle 2 provides that "[a] contractual venture which meets the condi-
tions for being considered a legal person under Chinese law, shall 
acquire the status of a Chinese legal person in accordance with 
law."72 However, the law offers no new assurance that contractual 
joint ventures will be favorably considered for Chinese-legal-person 
status. 
In this regard, one commentator has expressed concern that 
because in-kind contributions made to the venture are not always 
susceptible to precise valuation, the requirement that Chinese legal 
persons possess the necessary property or funds73 may frustrate ef-
forts to qualify such ventures as legal persons - and therefore 
make it more difficult to limit the liability of the venture. 74 Such 
concerns, one hopes, will be assuaged through implementing 
regulations. 
d. Timeliness of Contributions 
A high degree of attention is paid in the law to ensuring that 
contributions to the joint venture are timely made. Article 9 of the 
law requires that the parties "duly fulfil [sic] their obligations of 
contributing full investment" and do so "in accordance with the 
provisions of the laws and regulations" as well as those of the joint 
71. Id. 
72. Id. art. 2. 
73. See supra note 52. 
74. See Cohen, The Long-Awaited Cooperative Joint Venture Law, CHINA Bus. REV., 
15 July/August 1988 [hereinafter Cohen] . 
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venture contract.76 Upon failure to do so, "the matter shall be han-
dled by the examination and approval authority according to rele-
vant State provisions. "76 This provision raises two issues of great 
importance to the foreign investor. 
First, how will it affect the provisions of the joint venture con-
tract? Does it override any provision of the contract regarding fail-
ure to make timely contributions? If, for example, the Chinese 
party fails to make its contribution on a timely basis, what are the 
rights of the foreign party? May he avail himself of remedies pro-
vided for in the contract, or must he first submit the matter to the 
appropriate examination and approval authority (as the law ap-
pears to suggest)? 
This issue is of particular significance because the law specifi-
cally provides that, in case of the failure of either party to make its 
contributions on a timely basis, the administering authority "shall 
set another time limit for the fulfilment [sic] of such obligations";77 
i.e., actually grant extensions of deadlines that were agreed to con-
tractually. Furthermore, there is no indication whether the process 
contemplated by Article 9 is ex parte in nature or whether proce-
dural protections of any kind are available to the other party who 
has made its required contributions and stands ready to go 
forward. 
Second, what are the relevant "laws and regulations" and 
"State provisions" to which Article 9 refers? Among the possibili-
ties is China's Foreign Economic Contract Law,78 which governs 
joint venture contracts between Chinese and foreign parties and 
contains a number of provisions regarding dispute resolution and 
access to Chinese courts. 
Another possibility is the Contractual Joint Venture Law it-
self, Article 26 of which provides that disputes arising under the 
contract "shall be settled through consultation and mediation. "79 
Article 26 also contains provisions regarding arbitration and ulti-
mate resort to Chinese courts that substantially parallel those of 
the Foreign Economic Contract Law. 
The Chinese may also contemplate including in the imple-
menting regulations contemplated by the law provisions governing 
contributions to contractual joint ventures that parallel those cur-
75. Contractual Joint Venture Law, supra note 47, art. 9. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See infra note 102. 
79. Contractual Joint Venture Law, supra note 47,. art. 26. 
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rently in existence for equity joint ventures. 80 These regulations set 
forth in exhaustive detail the procedures that apply in the event 
either party to an equity joint venture fails to make any contribu-
tion on time. Under certain circumstances, such failure may result 
in the cancellation by the government of the joint venture. 
Article 9 raises the possibility that a contractual joint venturer 
who has met his obligations and made his commitments under the 
joint venture contract may be thrown into legal limbo while 
MOFERT or other Chinese governmental agencies consider the 
failure of the other side to perform under the contract. It is to be 
hoped that implementing regulations will significantly clarify the 
Chinese intent on this issue. 
e. Other Issues Raised by the Contractual Joint Venture Law 
A number of other issues raised by the Contractual Joint Ven-
ture Law require clarification in implementing regulations. For ex-
ample, what is the relationship between the Contractual Joint 
Venture Law and other applicable laws and regulations, and by 
what mechanisms will inconsistencies among them be resolved? 
China's regulations governing contracts for the importation of 
technology specifically provide that the term of technology import 
contracts may not exceed ten years. The Contractual Joint Ven-
ture Law contains no comparable provision. The technology import 
regulations as currently implemented also contain standards and 
time frames for the approval of contracts that differ from those in 
the Contractual Joint Venture Law and could conceivably result in 
the involvement of more than one approval authority. 
Other issues raised by the Contractual Joint Venture Law 
have been noted by commentators. These include the tax conse-
quences for joint venturers of their choices with respect to struc-
ture, financial contributions and the rate at which the investments 
of the parties are recouped81 and the extent to which contractual 
joint ventures will be able to avail themselves of tax and other 
(such as customs and labor-related) preferences currently available 
to equity joint ventures. 82 
80. See Certain Provisions on Contributions by the Parties to Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures, approved by the State Council on December 30, 1987 and issued jointly by 
MOFERT and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on January 1, 1988, 
transl. in 10 East Asian Executive Reports No. 4 (April 15, 1988), at 20. 
81. See generally Cohen, supra note 7 4. 
82. See Bates and Jianping, The New Cooperative Joint Venture Law, 10 East Asian 
Executive Reports No. 5 (May 15, 1988), at 7. 
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Each of these issues requires attention in the implementing 
regulations contemplated by the Contractual Joint Venture Law. 
Given their complexity, it is unlikely that the implementing regu-
lations will deal satisfactorily with all of them. In the meantime, it 
is fair to conclude that the Contractual Joint Venture Law has pro-
vided neither the complete legal certainty denied by foreign inves-
tors nor the maximum incentive to invest intended by the Chinese. 
C. Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprises 
A third option for investors in selecting a medium for doing 
business in China is to form a wholly foreign-owned enterprise. 
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprises83 provides a general legal framework for the es-
tablishment and operation of wholly foreign-owned enterprises in 
China. 
Foreign enterprise status offers a number of benefits for the 
foreign investor. First, foreign enterprises may qualify as Chinese 
legal persons under Chinese law,84 thus limiting their liability to 
the value of their assets. 85 
Second, foreign enterprise status clarifies ~he legal authority of 
the enterprise to repatriate all lawful profits (after payment of 
Chinese income taxes).86 Even the initial investment may be repa-
triated upon liquidation. 87 
Third, foreign enterprise status offers nominal assurance 
against expropriation88 and reasonable assurances against undue 
interference by the Chinese Government.89 Finally, foreign enter-
prise status assures the availability of certain preferential tax 
treatment that is available to joint ventures. 90 
83. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign- Owned Enterprises, 
adopted April 12, 1986, by the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, 
transl. in The China Business Review, July/August, 1986 [hereinafter the Foreign Enter-
prise Law]. 
84. Id. art. 8. See also supra note 52. 
85. The limitation on liability flows from the status of the enterprise as a Chinese legal 
person under the Civil Code. See Civil Code, supra note 23, art. 48. See also supra note 52. 
86. Foreign Enterprise Law, supra note 83, art. 19. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. art. 5. Expropriation or nationalization may be carried out if three criteria set 
forth in the Foreign Enterprise Law are met: the expropriation must be justified by social 
and public interest; it must be carried out in accordance with legal procedures; and (perhaps 
most important) "commensurate" compensation must be made. Id. 
89. Id. art. 11. 
90. For a detailed discussion of the tax treatment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises, 
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At this point, however, it is unclear whether wholly foreign-
owned enterprises offer significant advantages to the investor in 
comparison to joint ventures. The establishment, operations and 
finances of foreign-owned enterprises promise to be as heavily reg-
ulated as those of joint ventures.91 Also, restraints on the activities 
of wholly foreign-owned entities may not apply with equal vigor to 
entities with Chinese participation. 
The Foreign Enterprise Law requires that foreign owned enti-
ties must use advanced technology or equipment or export all or 
most of their products.92 This requirement may be more stringent 
than the comparable provision of the Joint Venture Law, which, in 
addition to permitting ventures that use advanced technology or 
are export-oriented, also expressly permits activities that help ex-
isting enterprises achieve technological reforms or provide training 
to technicians. 93 
In addition, to the extent a wholly foreign-owned enterprise is 
permitted to sell products in the Chinese market, it is conceivable 
that it may be at a competitive disadvantage relative to an entity 
formed with Chinese participation. Since the profits from such 
sales will be repatriated, the products of a wholly foreign-owned 
entity may experience discrimination in, for example, government 
procurement and may even be viewed as imports for purposes of 
Chinese regulatory requirements with respect to import 
substitution. 
Finally, although the Foreign Enterprise Law defines a wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise as one whose entire capital contribution 
is of foreign origin,94 the law does not define the term "capital" 
and is unclear regarding the implications of subsequent Chinese 
equity participation for the entity's legal status. 
D. Historical Profile of U.S. Investment Forms 
From the standpoint of the investment form selected, U.S. in-
vestment patterns in China have been atypical. While the contrac-
tual joint venture has established itself as the preferred form of 
investment in China overall, U.S. investors have chosen the equity 
joint venture by a large margin over contractual joint ventures. 95 
see Zheng II, supra note 44, at 290-291. 
91. See generally Zheng II, supra note 44, at 280-293. 
92. Foreign Enterprise Law, supra note 83, art. 3. 
93. See Zheng II, supra note 44, at 282. 
94. Foreign Enterprise Law, supra note 83, art. 2. 
95. Contractual joint ventures formed in China outnumbered total equity joint ventures 
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U.S. departure from the norm is largely a function of the types 
of investments that have been made by U.S. investors and reflects 
significant differences in investment priorities between U.S. inves-
tors, and, for example, investors located in Hong Kong and Macao, 
the largest statistical group of investors in China. The latter group, 
in part because of its geographical proximity to and cultural affin-
ity with China, is better-situated to exploit opportunities for the 
manufacture and export of a product in the short term.96 For this 
group, the flexibility of the contractual joint venture offers clear 
advantages over the relatively more rigid and formal structure of 
the equity joint venture. 
The typical U.S. investor, however, may have more long-term 
interests. With no current position in the market and no signifi-
cant commercial ties, this investor may simply wish to establish a 
foothold, hoping to increase access to Chinese markets over the 
long term. The relatively proven, if somewhat more rigid, equity 
joint venture may be preferable for this purpose, since it has his-
torically offered a greater degree of certainty and the prospect of 
long term market access.97 
Little information is available regarding the role of wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises in the mix of U.S. investment in China. Ac-
cording to Chinese data, only seven such entities had been formed 
as of December 31, 1986, representing only 0.2 percent of total U.S. 
investment. 98 It is likely that at least some of these were formed 
prior to promulgation of the Foreign Enterprise Law in that year. 
Therefore, experience with this form of investment is quite lim-
ited. However, if the Chinese economy continues to become more 
open to and tolerant of Western financial institutions, it is entirely 
likely that wholly foreign-owned enterprises will play a larger role. 
IV. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
While the Joint Venture Law, the Contractual Joint Venture 
Law and the Foreign Enterprise Law form the statutory frame-
work for the establishment of entities within China for activities 
involving technology transfer, other statutes, virtually all enacted 
after 1978, are also directly relevant to the creation of such entities 
4,383 to 3,213 as of December 31, 1986. As of the same date, U.S. equity joint ventures 
outnumber U.S. contractual joint ventures 219 to 53. Progress Report, supra note 4, at 98, 
99. 
96. See id. at 101. 
97. See id. at 109. 
98. Id. at 98. 
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and to the transfer of technology. 
A. The Economic Contract Law 
The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of 
China99 provides a comprehensive legal framework for contractual 
relations among Chinese parties. The Economic Contract Law gov-
erns contractual relations among Chinese legal persons and be-
tween Chinese legal persons and Chinese individuals. The Eco-
nomic Contract Law is of direct relevance to foreign investors 
because it affects domestic contractual relations between Chinese 
entities in which they have an interest as well as interpretations of 
later enacted statutes.100 
Such effects can be significant. The Economic Contract Law 
establishes a wide range of contract rules, many of which reflect 
the interest of the government in drafting a law that effectively 
implements the State Plan. For- example, under the Economic 
Contract Law, a contract that violates the State Plan is void. The 
principal remedy for breach under the Economic Contract Law is 
specific performance, reflecting the value placed by the law on 
agreed upon activities taking place in furtherance of the State 
Plan. Under the Economic Contract Law, if the non-breaching 
party insists on specific performance, the breaching party may not 
discharge its obligation by the payment of damages.101 
B. The Foreign Related Economic Contracts Law 
China promulgated the Foreign Related Economic Contracts 
Law in 1985.102 The FECL applies to non-transport contracts be-
tween Chinese organizations or enterprises and organizations or in-
dividuals whose principal place of business is outside the PRC.108 
The FECL, however, does not apply to contractual relation-
ships between Chinese entities and entities formed in China pursu-
99. The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 
Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and promulgated by Order No. 12 of 
the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 
13, 1981 and effective as of July l, 1982 [hereinafter the Economic Contract Law]. 
100. Article 55 provides that "[r]egulations on economic and trade contracts involving 
foreign interests shall be formulated separately with reference to the principles of this law 
and international practice." (emphasis added) 
101. Id. art. 35. 
102. Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 
Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on. 
March 21, 1985, effective as of July 1, 1985 [hereinafter FECL]. 
103. Id. art. 2. 
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ant to joint ventures. The latter are considered domestic entities 
under Chinese law to be domestic entities and relationships be-
tween Chinese legal persons are governed by the Economic Con-
tract Law. Derived from statutes developed earlier at the regional 
level, particularly the contract regulations developed by the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone10" and the Dalian Economic and 
Technological Development Zone, 10~ the FECL does not supersede 
its predecessors, which continue to apply to contractual relations 
between domestic entities in these zones. The contract law gov-
erning an operation thus may differ, depending not only on 
whether a domestic entity is established, but also on whether the 
entity is located in either of these zones.106 
Unlike the Economic Contract Law, the FECL was adopted 
expressly with foreign interests in mind107 and conforms generally 
to internationally accepted commercial practices to accommodate 
foreign interests. For example, while the Shenzhen Contract Regu-
lations require that foreign investors agree to performance guaran-
tees with respect to imported technology, such a requirement is 
absent from the FECL. 
The Shenzhen Contract Regulations contain no express au-
thority to select a governing law. As a practical matter this means 
that contracts negotiated under these regulations have often been 
silent on this critical issue. The FECL, in contrast provides that 
the parties may select any law, or specified provisions thereof, to 
govern contractual disputes and only in the absence of such a 
choice shall Chinese law apply.108 
104. Provisions of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Foreign Economic Con-
tracts, promulgated January 11, 1984 [hereinafter Shenzhen Contract Regulations]. 
105. Procedures of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone for the 
Administration of Foreign Economic Contracts, promulgated October 15, 1984, by the 
Dalian People's Government [hereinafter Dalian Contract Regulations]. 
106. One observer has indicated that, while the laws may differ on particulars, the com-
parative liberality of the FECL and its national standing may encourage resolution of dis-
putes in favor of more liberal treatment. See ZHENG, supra note 10, at 54. 
107. FECL, supra note 102, art 1. states: "This Law is formulated with a view to pro-
tecting the lawful rights and interests of the parties to Chinese-foreign economic contracts 
and promoting the development of China's foreign economic relations." (emphasis added) 
108. Id. art. 5. Article 5 also provides, however, that "[t]he law of the People's Republic 
of China shall apply to contracts that are to be performed within the territory of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, namely contracts for Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chi-
nese-foreign contractual joint ventures and Chinese-foreign cooperative exploration and de-
velopment of natural resources." 
The above provision appears to limit sharply the ability of foreign investors to apply 
non-Chinese law to contracts for the est:abolishment of joint ventures whose activities will 
be carried out in China. While the FECL governs the formation of such contracts and pro-
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Other provisions of the FECL require that contracts must be 
in writing109 and provide that such contracts are not binding until 
approved by the appropriate authority. The latter provision re-
flects a fact of economic life in the PRC, particularly with respect 
to joint ventures involving substantial investment by the domestic 
party to the contract. As a practical matter, conclusion of a negoti-
ation with a joint venture partner evidenced by a written agree-
ment does not constitute a binding contract under the FECL until 
the venture has received governmental approval. Investors, there-
fore, muat be extremely wary of all representations regarding au-
thority to approve any joint venture. 
Damages allow~ble under the FECL are limited to conse-
quential damages, which may not exceed the loss that the breach-
ing party "ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract as a possible consequence of a breach of contract. "110 
Punitive damages are not permitted under the FECL.111 Liqui-
dated damages, however, are recoverable unless they are substan-
tially disproportionate to the loss. In such circumstances a ·party 
may seek to hav~ the amount of liquidated damages adjusted 
through arbitration or by a court.112 
Unlike the Economic Contract Law, the FECL specifically 
provides that contracts shall be performed and interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the law applicable at the time of execu-
tion.113 Prior to the promulgation of the FECL, Chinese negotia-
tors frequently had been unable to offer this assurance. Inclusion 
of this provision marked an important concession to the need of 
foreign investors for certainty and predictability.11" 
vides a framework for dispute-resolution in the event of breach, the terms of the contract, 
the measure of performance and the obligations and liabilities of the parties will be deter-
mined under Chinese law. Only where there is no governing Chinese law provision will inter-
national practice be followed. Id. 
109. Id. art. 7. Article 7 appears to contemplate, however, that a contract may be 
formed by a series of documents, provided they reasonably indicate the intent of the parties. 
110. Id. art. 19. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. art. 20. 
113. Id. art. 40. 
114. The absence of a specific contract sanctity provision remains a concern in the con-
text of the Economic Contract Law because of its stated purposes, which include "ensuring 
fulfillment of state plans and promoting the development of socialist modernization." Eco-
nomic Contract Law, supra note 99, art. 1. 
Deference to the State Plan permeates the Economic Contract Law. For example, "con-
tracts that concern economic dealings in products or projects under an indicative state plan 
shall be concluded after taking account of state-issued targets .. . "Id. art. 11. "If state-fixed 
prices for a commodity have dropped, the contract price of the commodity shall be adjusted 
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The FECL provides that the parties shall, as far as possible, 
settle contract disputes through consultation or through mediation 
by a third party.m This provision reflects a general Chinese pref-
erence for working out disagreements without resort to litigation 
and is similar to the provision of the Economic Contract Law.116 
Like the Economic Contract Law, the FECL provides for arbi-
tration and judicial proceedings as possible dispute-settlement al-
ternatives.117 Unlike the Economic Contract Law, however, the 
FECL provides that the parties may specify the country in which 
arbitration is to take place. In practice, this has often meant that 
an arbitration body of a neutral country, such as the Stockholm 
Institute, is selected.118 
The FECL permits recourse to a "people's court" under cer-
tain circumstances. 119 The precise circumstances under which such 
recourse is available are not clear. First, FECL Article 38, which 
contains the relevant provision, appears on its face to apply only if 
no arbitration clause is provided in the contract.120 Therefore, by 
including an arbitration clause in their contract, the parties may 
have waived any contractual right to judicial consideration of their 
differences. 
Second, even if the contract does not contain an arbitration 
clause, Article 38 appears to grant authority to sue only if a written 
arbitration agreement is not reached "afterwards."121 This provi-
sion appears to relate back to FECL Article 37, which provides for 
arbitration of disputes pursuant to either an arbitration clause in 
the contract or "a written agreement reached by the parties after-
ward."122 This may require at least a good faith effort by the par-
ties to agree to arbitration - and a failure to agree - before litiga-
tion may be commenced. 
For example, neutral arbitration bodies, such as Sweden's 
Stockholm Institute are often specified in arbitration clauses. If a 
Chinese party to a contract refuses to agree to arbitration outside 
accordingly." Id. art. 17. 
115. Id. art. 37. 
116. See id. art. 48. 
117. Cf. id. art. 48 and FECL, supra note 102, art. 37. 
118. See ZHENG, supra note 10, at 67 n.139. 
119. FECL, supra note 102, art. 38 
120. Id. art. 38. Article 38 provides: "In case neither arbitration clause provided [sic] in 
the contract nor written arbitration agreement reached afterwards, parties may bring suit in 
the People's Court." 
121. Id. 
122. Id. art. 37. 
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China and a foreign investor wishes to avoid recourse to litigation 
in a Chinese court, he may take the position that the conditions of 
Article 38 providing for court review have not been met because 
the other side has unreasonably failed to agree to arbitration. 
Although the FECL appears to require that suits arising under 
Article 38 be heard in Chinese courts, apparently this is not always 
the case. One writer has referred to a limited number of cases in 
which courts outside China have been specified in the contract as 
the court of jurisdiction. 123 
C. Recent Development: The United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods came into force January 1, 1988.12• The 
United States and China are signatories to the Convention, which 
is self-executing and, therefore, effective without implementing 
legislation.1215 The Convention applies to contracts for the sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in different 
contracting States.126 Where a party has more than one place of 
business, the place of business most closely related to the contract 
and its performance will be used to determine the applicability of 
the convention. 127 
The purpose of the Convention is to supply rules by which 
contractual disputes may be resolved when the contract itself pro-
vides no guidance. Thus, while the parties to a contract are free to 
specify the law that shall apply to disputes, the Convention sup-
plies a set of commercially reasonable rules of decision in the event 
that they do not. The Convention parallels the United States' Uni-
123. ZHENG, supra note 10, at 67 n.137. 
124. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97 /18 (1980), reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods: Official Records at 178-90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 
(1981) [hereinafter Convention]. 
125. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the Convention on Octo-
ber 9, 1986, subject to the reservation noted infra, note 126. President Reagan ratified the 
Convention by Proclamation on November 10, 1986. 
126. The Convention also applies to contracts between parties of different states when 
the rules of "private international law" lead to the application of the law of a contracting 
state, even if the other state has not acceded to the Convention. Convention, supra note 
124, Art. l(l)(b). However, the United States made a reservation to this provision and is not 
bound by it. 
127. "Place of business" is not defined in the Convention. Article 10 of the Convention 
provides that, if a party has no place of business, reference will be made to his habitual 
residence. 
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form Commercial Code in many respects. 
The Convention will affect the implementation of the FECL 
with respect to matters that the Convention addresses128 and will 
provide additional certainty for U.S. investors in the PRC in a 
number of areas. For example, as previously noted, many contracts 
between U.S. and Chinese parties are silent on the question of 
what law governs the contract because of the inability of the par-
ties to agree on this important issue. The absence of a contractual 
provision on this issue can be a major problem when disputes arise. 
If the contract is subject to the Convention, however, the parties 
can agree not to agree on the issue, taking comfort in the knowl-
edge that the Convention itself provides both commercially reason-
able rules of interpretation and commercially reasonable remedies 
in the event disputes arise. 
The Convention will not solve every problem, of course. First, 
it may not apply to technology licensing agreements at all, because, 
by its terms, it applies only to contracts for the sale of goods. In 
addition, in some cases, there may be substantial question as to 
whether a "sale" is involved. For example, the Convention applies 
to contracts for the sale of goods "to be manufactured or produced 
... unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a 
substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or 
production. "129 
Consider the case of a contractual joint venture for the pro-
duction of products intended for export in which the foreign inves-
tor supplies technology or know-how and the Chinese party pro-
vides raw materials, skilled labor and a production facility. The 
parties agree that the foreign party will recoup its investment in 
kind out of the production of the venture. In such a case, it may be 
argued that the joint venture is in reality a contract for the sale of 
the product to the foreign participant. 
Even were such an arrangement properly characterized as a 
sale, however, the applicability of the Convention may still depend 
on whether the foreign party had supplied "a substantial part of 
the materials necessary for ... manufacture or production" of the 
128. Civil Code, supra note 23, art. 142, provides: 
Where an international treaty that the People's Republic of China has concluded or 
participates in contains a provision different from the civil law of the People's Re-
public of China, the provisions of the international treaty apply except for an article 
to which the People's Republic of China has declared a reservation. 
Civil Code, supra note 23, art. 142. 
129. Convention, supra note 124, art. 3(1). 
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product by contributing technology or know-how. If it has, the 
Convention would appear not to apply. 
Similarly, there may be a question as to whether a sale is suffi-
ciently related to goods to trigger application of the Convention. 
For example, the Convention does not apply to contracts in which 
a " ... preponderant part of the obligations of the party who fur-
nishes the goods consists in the supply of labour or other ser-
vices. "130 Under circumstances where the Chinese party supplies a 
physical plant and skilled labor to operate the machinery, the Con-
vention may thus not apply. 
Second, the Convention may not apply if the U.S. party has 
opened an office in China. If that office constitutes a "place of bus-
iness" and is determined to be the place of business most closely 
related to the performance of the contract, there may not be a con-
tract between parties whose places of business are in two different 
contracting states, 131 as required by the Convention. 
Third, the Convention, even if applicable, does not necessarily 
offer the assurance of predictability that may first be supposed. 
Although it provides rules of decision that may be applied to a 
variety of typical contractual problems, it does not specify what 
body should apply those rules. Should recourse be made to judicial 
remedies, the parties may find themselves in a Chinese court, 
where language barriers, Chinese counsel and unfamiliar proce-
dures may present a host of problems. In addition, the availability 
of traditional contract remedies, such as specific performance and 
punitive damages, may depend on the application of Chinese law 
by a Chinese court. 
D. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the 
Administration of Contracts for the Import of Technology 
In the early 1980's, following several years of centralized gov-
ernment control over imports of technology that resulted in a num-
ber of failures,132 the Chinese government substantially altered its 
technology-import policies and permitted technology import deci-
sions to be "decentralized" to the provincial and municipal level. 
The new policy permitted more localized decisions and was in-
130. Id. art. 3(2). 
131. Id. art. l(l)(a). 
132. For a description of some of the more egregious failures in China's early efforts to 
import technology, see generally Lubman, Technology Transfer to China: Policies, Law. 
and Practice, MosER, supra note 9, at 170-198. 
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tended to encourage imports of machinery, know-how and other 
intellectual property that could more easily be assimilated into lo-
cal economies. 
Decentralization, however, brought a proliferation of technol-
ogy transfer arrangements that did not necessarily reflect larger 
national needs. Regional authorities did not engage in careful eco-
nomic planning and tended to purchase technology that was not 
easily assimilated, that duplicated previously planned or executed 
purchases, or whose importation was inconsistent with the State 
Plan. Regional officials were ill-equipped to deal with sophisticated 
foreign investors and often had unrealistic business expectations. 
Consequently, many of the mistakes previously made at the na-
tional level were repeated at the regional level. The national gov-
ernment responded by instituting a process of "recentralization" 
that brought many decisions back to the national level where they 
could be evaluated for consistency with national needs in light of 
available financial resources. 
1. The Technology Trans/ er Regulations and Implementing 
Measures 
To further the recentralization process, on May 24, 1985, the 
State Council issued Regulations of the People's Republic of China 
on the Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China,133 followed on October 1, 1985, by the 
Measures for Examination and Approval of Technology Import 
Contracts (the "Implementing Measures"), providing for review 
and approval of all contracts for the import of technology into 
China. 
The Technology Transfer Regulations permit Chinese authori-
ties to examine closely and approve contracts involving the impor-
tation of technology. The Regulations define "technology imports" 
as "technological items obtained, through trade or economic and 
technical cooperation, by companies, enterprises, organizations or 
individuals ... within the People's Republic of China from compa-
nies, enterprises, organizations or individuals outside the People's 
Republic of China."134 Items that qualify as technology imports in-
133. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Technol-
ogy Import Contracts of the People's Republic of China, promulgated on May 24, 1985, by 
the State Council, transl. in China Economic News Supplement No. 1, February 8, 1988 
[hereinafter the Technology Transfer Regulations]. 
134. Id. art. 2. 
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elude patents, technological processes, product designs and techni-
cal and quality control services, as well as licensing arrangements 
for patents or other industrial property rights, the transfer of other 
proprietary technology and the rendering of technical services. 135 
The Technology Transfer Regulations govern technology im-
port contracts between Chinese entities (defined for this purpose 
to include equity and contractual joint ventures and wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises) and foreign entities.136 The Regulations do 
not, however, govern contracts for technology tr an sf ers that consti-
tute the equity contribution of a foreign participant to one of these 
entities. Contracts for these transfers are governed instead by "the 
related laws and regulations of the State on foreign investment en-
terprises;" such laws presumably include the Joint Venture Law, 
the Contractual Joint Venture Law and the Foreign Enterprise 
Law.131 
The Technology Transfer Regulations require that imported 
technology be "advanced" and "appropriate" (neither term is de-
fined)138 and that it meet at least one of eight criteria specified in 
Article 3 of the Regulations. These criteria include the contribu-
tion of the imported technology to the development and produc-
tion of new products, its ability to raise scientific and technical 
135. The full list of technology import contracts expressly covered by the Regulations is 
as follows: 
1. Contracts for transferring or the licensing of industrial property rights; 
2. Contracts for licensing of technical know-how; 
3. Contracts for technical services; 
4. Co-production or co-design contracts that provide for any of items 1-3, above; 
5. Contracts for "end-units" that provide for any of times 1-3, above; and 
6. Any other contracts which, "in the view of the competent authority," require review 
and approval under the Regulations. 
Id. art. 2. 
136. The application of the Technology Transfer Regulations is not so limited in the 
Regulations themselves. The limitation is found in Article 4 of the current rules implement-
ing the Regulations. See infra, note 146. 
The Technology Transfer Regulations may also apply to contracts between foreign enti-
ties registered in the PRC and joint ventures with Chinese legal person status, although 
they do not specifically so state. See Horsley, National Technology Transfer Regs Codify 
General Policies on the Import of Technology, East Asian Executive Reports, July, 1985, at 
9-10. 
137. The Technology Transfer Regulations do not contain this specific exclusion. It is 
found at Article 4 of the current rules implementing the Regulations. See infra note 146. 
138. Predecessor regulations issued at the regional level suggest that qualifying technol-
ogy must be of an "advanced world standard." See, e.g., the Interim Provisions of the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone for the lrnport of Technology, promulgated February 8, 
1984, art. 6, and the Provisions of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone for the Import of 
Technology promulgated July 14, 1984. Horsley, supra note 136, at 10. 
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standards, its ability to increase exports and foreign exchange 
earnings and its contribution to environmental protection.139 
The technology must be imported pursuant to a written con-
tract, 140 the term of which may generally not exceed ten years.141 
The contract must provide a guarantee on the part of the trans-
fer or that the transferred technology is capable of achieving the 
technological objectives specified in the contract and that the tech-
nology transferred is "complete, correct, effective and capable of 
accomplishing the technical targets specified in the contract."142 
The Technology Transfer Regulations impose a number of re-
straints on the ability of the transferor to specify advantageous 
contractual terms. For example, special approval is required for 
any "tie-in" arrangements under which the transferor may require 
the transferee to purchase other items not necessarily related to 
the technology;143 for any restraints on the ability of the transferee 
to obtain the same or similar technology from other sources; or to 
improve the technology once it has been transferred. 144 
Finally, consistent with the Joint Venture Regulations, the 
Technology Transfer Regulations provide that, upon the expiration 
of the contract, the transferee may continue to use the technology 
indefinitely. Thus, for all practical purposes, the transferee owns 
the technology upon expiration.10 
2. The Detailed Rules 
On January 20, 1988, MOFERT issued a new set of detailed 
139. Article 3.of the Technology Transfer Regulations provides in full as follows: 
The technology to be imported must be advanced and appropriate and shall at least 
conform to one of the following requirements: 
1. Capable of developing and producing new products; 
2. Capable of improving quality and performance of products, reducing production 
cost and lowering consumption of energy or raw materials; 
3. Favorable to maximum utilization of local resources; 
4. Capable of expanding product export and increasing earnings of foreign 
currencies; 
5. Favorable to environmental protection; 
6. Favorable to production safety; 
7. Favorable to improvement of management; and 
8. Contributing to advancement of scientific and technological level [sic]. 
Technology Transfer Regulations, supra note 133, art. 3. 
140. Id. art. 4. 
141. Id. art. 15. 
142. Id. art. 6. 
143. Id. art. 9. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
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rules146 implementing the Technology Transfer Regulations. The 
Detailed Rules supersede the 1985 Implementing Measures and 
depart from them in significant ways. 
First, the Detailed Rules appear to expand the purview of the 
Technology Transfer Regulations by permitting the examination 
and approval by MOFERT (or its delegate) of any "technology im-
port contracts which need to go through the procedure of examina-
tion and approval in the view of the competent authority" (em-
phasis added). 147 Although this provision does not appear to 
permit review of contracts that constitute equity contributions to 
joint ventures, the competent reviewing authority nevertheless has 
broad discretion as to whether to demand examination and ap-
proval of a contract not encompassed by one of the specified cate-
gories of reviewable contracts. 
It may be impossible to know in advance whether compliance 
with the Detailed Rules is necessary, and suppliers of technology 
should anticipate their contracts being subjected to government 
approval procedures even though this is not specifically required 
by the Technology Transfer Regulations. Whenever possible, sup-
pliers should comply with the Detailed Rules in order to ensure 
approval of the contract.1" 8 
Second, in an effort to guard against vague and incomplete 
contracts intended to evade the requirements of the Technology 
Tran sf er Regulations, the Detailed Rules specify in great detail the 
terms that must be included in a technology import contract. 
Among other things, the contract must specify the type of technol-
ogy to be imported, set forth any confidentiality obligations, con-
tain a breakdown of the price and provide methods for dispute 
resolution.149 
The price, especially, is a factor to which the Chinese have de-
voted considerable attention. Stating the price of the contract as 
146. The Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Regulations on 
Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the People's Republic of China, ap-
proved by the State Council, December 30, 1987, promulgated by MOFERT January 20, 
1988; transl. in China Economic News Supplement No. 1, Feb. 8, 1988 [hereinafter Detailed 
Rules]. 
147. Id. art. 2(6). 
148. The Detailed Rules do provide for issuance of an "advance opinion" by MOFERT 
at the request of the licensee. The licensor, however, is not permitted to request such an 
opinion and so must first convince the licensee that it is desirable to do so. The request then 
becomes simply another item to be negotiated. The limited availability of this feature may 
actually place the foreign licensor at a disadvantage. 
149. Id. art. 7. 
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one consolidated figure is not sufficient under the Detailed Rules. 
The contract price must be broken down and itemized so that the 
various costs can be separately evaluated. 1M 
Third, the Detailed Rules address the issue of contractual tie-
in provisions in a different fashion than the Technology Tran sf er 
Regulations. The Regulations require that tie-in provisions for raw 
materials, spare parts, or related equipment be specifically ap-
proved by the reviewing authority.m Article 10 of the Detailed 
Rules appears to permit tie-in provisions for raw materials, spare 
parts, or related equipment without specific approval, but limits 
the price a supplier can charge for these items to the price a simi-
lar product would command on the international market. m Pre-
sumably, this latter change was made in an effort to permit in-
creased flexibility in contractual arrangements). 
Fourth, the Detailed Rules circumscribe the terms of confiden-
tiality agreements contained in technology import contracts. Under 
the Technology Transfer Regulations, the parties are expressly 
permitted to negotiate confidentiality agreements regarding trans-
ferred technology that survive the expiration of the contract.163 
The Detailed Rules, however, limit confidentiality agreements re-
garding proprietary technology and know-how to the term of the 
contract. 164 Since a contract is itself generally limited to a ten-year 
period by the Technology Transfer Regulations, 166 confidentiality 
agreements are also limited generally to ten years. If extraordinary 
circumstances require a longer period of confidentiality, provisions 
to this effect must be included in the contract and an explanation 
made to the reviewing authority when applying for examination 
and approval. 166 
The Detailed Rules require (as did the Implementing Mea-
sures) that contracts signed by Chinese foreign equity joint ven-
tures, co-operative ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
be submitted to a competent national, regional, or local entity for 
approval.167 The Detailed Rules clarify the operation of this re-
quirement by establishing a hierarchical system that is based upon 
150. Id. 
151. Technology Transfer Regulations, supra note 133, art. 9. 
152. Detailed Rules, supra note 146, art. 10. 
153. Technology Transfer Regulations, supra note 133, art. 7. 
154. Detailed Rules, supra note 146, art. 13. 
155. Technology Transfer Regulations, supra note 133, art. 8. 
156. Id. art. 13. 
157. Id. arts. 5 and 6. 
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the approval level of the feasibility study associated with the 
contract. 
If the feasibility study was approved by any of the ministries 
or departments directly under the State Council, the contract must 
be examined and approved by MOFERT. If the feasibility study 
was approved by a local or regional government, that authority 
would be responsible for approving the contract. This system en-
sures that the entity most familiar with the proposed project and 
its feasibility study has an opportunity to review the completed 
contract. 
There are exceptions, however. For example, certain contracts 
signed by entities in Beijing - such as a government agency or 
foreign trade corporation - on behalf of end-users located else-
where in China must be examined and approved by MOFERT re-
gardless of the level at which the feasibility study was approved.168 
Under the Detailed Rules, a reviewing authority may reject a 
contract for any of the following reasons: 
(1) it violates the laws of the state and hurts the public 
interest; 
(2) it infringes on national sovereignty; 
(3) its terms are not consistent with the feasibility study; 
(4) the basic clauses and content are imperfect; 
(5) no provisions are made for dispute resolution; 
(6) no stipulation is made as to the efficiency of the technology 
or the quality warranty on the resulting manufactured products; 
(7) the price or method of payment is questionable; 
(8) the rights, responsibilities and obligations of the con-
tracting parties are unclear or unfair; or 
(9) it contains preferential tax commitments that do not have 
the approval of the relevant tax authority.169 
Once a contract has been rejected, however, it is not beyond 
redemption. The parties may amend it within a certain period 
specified by the approval authority. Only if the parties take no cor-
rective measures will the contract be completely rejected. 160 
As an extra measure of protection for the recipient, the De-
tailed Rules require the supplier to guarantee that it is the rightful 
owner of the technology in question or that it has the right to dis-
pose of such property.161 If a third party subsequently brings a 
158. Id. art. 6. 
159. Id. art. 18. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. art. 11. 
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lawsuit for infringement against the recipient, the supplier will be 
obligated to defend the suit and indemnify the recipient for any 
losses sustained. 162 
The Detailed Rules also provide that improvements to the 
transferred technology made by the recipient, as well as any patent 
claims thereto, belong to the recipient.163 This provision operates 
as a restriction on the ability of the transferor of the technology to 
negotiate "grantback" clauses under which rights to improvements 
in the technology effected by the recipient are contractually 
granted to the transferor. Under the detailed rules such improve-
ments belong to the transferee. If the transferee wishes to grant 
rights to them, it may demand compensation on terms provided 
for by the contract. 
While this provision may be of limited concern to firms deal-
ing in rapidly evolving technologies, it reflects the Chinese view 
that, once a technology import contract is executed, the imported 
technology effectively belongs to the recipient. As is the case under 
the Joint Venture Law, the Detailed Rules permit a recipient to 
continue using imported technology following the expiration of the 
contract unless the approval authority has approved a contract 
clause that prohibits its use after that time.164 Licensors of tech-
nology to the Chinese should bear in mind, therefore, that they are 
in effect selling their technology to the recipient, not simply per-
mitting the use of it. 
Although the Technology Transfer Regulations provide a uni-
form, national set of requirements and procedures for the content 
and approval of technology transfer contracts, they have not, as 
implemented, offered significant improvements in the regulatory 
climate for the foreign investor, for the following reasons. 
First, the Regulations differ in several respects from the pred-
ecessor Shenzhen and Xiamen Regulations but fail to clarify their 
relationship to those regulations (which remain in effect). 
Second, the Regulations do not form the sole regulatory 
framework for technology transfer contracts. As noted previously, 
the Regulations as implemented do not apply to imports of tech-
nology that constitute a foreign investor's equity contribution to 
the venture. However, any other contracts for the transfer of tech-
nology to these entities are governed by the Regulations. Thus, for-
162. Id. 
163. Id. art. 12. 
164. Id. art. 15. 
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eign investors who enter into joint ventures in anticipation of li-
censing technology or providing services to these joint ventures 
other than as part of the formation of the venture must proceed 
along two different approval tracks. 
As has been pointed out by one commentator, licensing ar-
rangements are frequently negotiated at the same time as the 
terms of the joint venture itself, yet the licensing side of the trans-
action cannot be approved until the joint venture itself comes into 
existence. This exposes the foreign investor to the risk that, once it 
has committed equity to the project, the licensing agreement may 
not be approved.161 
In addition, while MOFERT has indicated that it will not dis-
turb contracts associated with previously approved joint ven-
tures,166 there is no specific provision for this in either the Tech-
nology Transfer Regulations or the Detailed Rules, leaving yet 
another issue to be carefull ly dealt with by contract. 
Thus, while the Detailed Rules codify recent Chinese practice 
with respect to the approval and implementation of technology im-
port contracts, they leave, as does the new Contractual Joint Ven-
ture Law, some questions unanswered. If history is any guide, 
these questions will, in time, be addressed by new implementing 
regulations that clarify certain issues while raising still others. 
V. THE CHINESE PATENT LAW AND PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO THE 
PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
A. Patent Law 
The scope and quality of patent protection is a major consid-
eration to any investor considering doing business in any country. 
In 1978, the Chinese government, recognizing that, consistent with 
socialist principles, some accommodation had to be made to the 
need to encourage individual initiative and inventiveness, and that 
China's failure to accord adequate protection to foreign technology 
was resulting in far higher acquisition costs for that technology, 167 
made a commitment to the establishment of acceptable standards 
of protection for intellectual property. The Patent Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China was promulgated six years later, on March 
165. See T. Gelatt, New Technology Transfer Measures Issued, East Asian Executive 
Reports, Nov. 15, 1985. 
166. See id. 
167. For an illustrative discussion of problems experienced as a result of the lack of 
adequate patent protection in particular, see ZHENG, supra note 10, at 410, 411. 
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12, 1984, and became effective on April 1, 1985.168 China pro-
claimed its intention to adhere to the Paris Convention169 on 
March 19, 1985, and formally acceded to the Convention in No-
vember of 1986. 
The Patent Law is generally consistent with the minimal re-
quirements of the Paris Convention. However, its coverage is gen-
erally less liberal than that accorded by most Paris Convention sig-
natories (on the other hand, its coverage is more liberal than many 
developing countries, which often limit the scope and quality of 
patent protection in order more easily to develop home industries 
using technology patented elsewhere). 
The Patent Law excludes from patentability inventions that 
violate the law, social morality or the public interest.170 While 
these are potentially broad and subjective exclusions, they are typ-
ical of many patent regimes. Also excluded are rules and methods 
for mental activities (a term generally including computer pro-
grams and software),171 methods for the diagnosis and treatment of 
disease,172 animal and plant varieties,173 pharmaceutical products 
and substances derived from a chemical process17" and food, bever-
ages and flavorings. 176 
Three features of the Patent Law are especially worthy of 
note. First, China has chosen to adopt the "first-to-file" approach 
for its patent system, under which "novelty" (a fundamental ele-
ment of patentability) exists only if, among other things, no prior 
application has been filed for the identical invention.176 Under this 
approach, the first application for a patentable invention will be 
approved even though a subsequent applicant (or a person who ob-
jects to the first application) may earlier have satisfied the require-
ments of patentability.177 
168. The Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted March 12, 1984, at the 
Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, effec-
tive as of April 1, 1985 [hereinafter Patent Law]. 
Regulations for implementing the Patent Law were promulgated by the Patent Office of 
China (the Patent Office was established in 1980) on January 19, 1985. 
169. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 21 UST 1630-
1677. 
170. Patent Law, supra note 168, art. 5. 
171. Id. art. 25. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. art. 22. 
177. A significant exception to this requirement was created when China acceded to the 
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Second, China has adopted a "limited world novelty" ap-
proach to the patenting of inventions. This means that, an appli-
cant must not have previously permitted the invention to enter the 
public domain in any form, including having received a patent 
elsewhere on the invention. 
An exception to this general rule renders it largely irrelevant 
for U.S. investors. As previously described, China, pursuant to the 
Paris Convention, undertook to allow a "grace period" during 
which inventions for which patents are sought in China may be 
considered "novel" notwithstanding the filing of patent applica-
tions not more than one year earlier (six months for design pat-
ents) in other signatory nations. 
Third, the Patent Law provides for "compulsory licensing." 
Under the Patent Law, if a patent holder fails to exploit the bene-
fits permitted by the patent in China (i.e., manufacture the prod-
uct or utilize a patented process) during the three-year period fol-
lowing granting of the patent, another person or entity may be 
licensed to do so.178 While compulsory licensing is a feature not 
uncommon among patent regimes of Western countries, it is alto-
gether absent from U.S. patent law, which grants the holder virtu-
ally absolute authority to withhold the benefits of his invention 
from society. 
In practice, the compulsory licensing provision of the Patent 
Law is not likely to be as burdensome as it sounds and the percep-
tion that the would-be licensee may be able to achieve through ad-
ministrative fiat what he cannot get through negotiations is not 
justified. 
First, in order for the provision to have any effect, the patent 
must go unexploited for three years after it has been granted. 
Second, in order to petition successfully for a compulsory li-
cense, the would-be licensee must first establish that he is qualified 
to exploit the license.179 He must then demonstrate that the patent 
holder has unreasonably withheld a license, e.g., that he has de-
manded unreasonable terms or has acted unreasonably in some 
other way.180 
Paris Convention, signatories to which agree to grant a one-year priority right to inventions 
patented in other signatory countries. The grace period allows inventions for which patents 
are sought in China to be considered novel notwithstanding the filing of patent applications 
not more than one year earlier (six months for design patents) in other signatory nations. 
178. Patent Law, supra note 168, art. 52. 
179. Id. arts. 52-53. 
180. Id. 
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Finally, a licensee under this provision must pay reasonable 
license fees and may not sub-license the patent to anyone else.181 
This means that even if the government grants a compulsory li-
cense, the licensor remains entitled to fees that might at least be 
commercially reasonable even if not what he may have refused. 
On balance, while the compulsory licensing feature of the Pat-
ent Law raises a number of potentially troublesome issues for the 
foreign patent holder, its most likely impact will be to add addi-
tional incentives for the successful negotiation of technology licens-
ing arrangements in China. 
Other aspects of the scope and quality of patent protection 
available in China have been the source of some discontent among 
investors - particularly U.S. investors - interested in doing business 
there. For example, as noted previously, the Patent Law does not 
afford protection to pharmaceutical products and products result-
ing from chemical processes. This exclusion creates difficulty for 
the U.S. pharmaceutical and fertilizer industries. Each has re-
ported significant problems with piracy. 
China justifies the exclusion of these classes of products on the 
basis of its status as a developing nation and its need to provide 
protection for its infant industries. China also points out that, 
under the Patent Law, process patent protection is available for 
these types of products. However, the affected industries complain 
that process patent protection is without significance since, once 
such a product has been reverse-engineered, it may often be repro-
duced by a variety of unpatented methods or processes.182 
Second, as previously noted, China does not offer patent pro-
tection for computer programs and software.183 
Third, there is concern that China's patent system as adminis-
tered does not offer the full protection contemplated by the law. 
As yet, non-Chinese are not permitted to submit or prosecute pat-
ent applications before the Patent Office.184 Foreign applicants 
181. Id. 
182. Article 60 of the Patent Law suggests, however, that in process patent infringe-
ment cases, the burden may be on the alleged infringer to demonstrate that the process used 
was other than the patented process. This is a heavy burden, and, if it must be carried by 
the defendant, the level of patent protection for chemically derived substances in China 
would be substantially strengthened. 
183. There are indications, however, that software that is "built-into" an otherwise pat-
entable product may be patentable as part of the product. In this regard, see R. Conroy, 
Technology Transfer to China: Legal and Practical Considerations, 21 STANFORD J. INT'L. L. 
549 [hereinafter Conroy], at 567 n.43. 
184. Foreigners having a "habitual residence or business establishment" within China 
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perceive that they are placed at a disadvantage by the requirement 
that all applications be made and supported by Chinese before a 
Chinese governmental agency. 
Fourth, the Patent Law contains no sanctions for contributory 
infringement - infringement by others involved in the chain of in-
fringing steps such as contract manufacturers, shippers, wholesal-
ers and retailers - and provides no clear access to the courts if 
infringement problems are not resolved. 
Finally, some observers have noted that, while it does not dis-
tinguish in most material respects between foreign and domestic 
patent applicants, and thus may be said to provide national treat-
ment to all patent holders and applicants, the Patent Law may 
violate at least the spirit of the U.S.-China Trade Agreement,186 in 
which the United States and China agreed to provide reciprocal 
treatment in the areas covered by the Agreement, which applies to 
patents, trademarks, copyrights and other intellectual property. 
Article VI of the U.S.-China Trade Agreement appears to pro-
vide for reciprocal undertakings by the parties with respect to the 
degree of protection afforded intellectual property. Subparagraph 
(3) of Article VI provides that "[b]oth Contracting Parties agree 
that each Party shall seek, under its laws and with due regard to 
international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of the 
other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to the 
patent and trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the 
other Party."186 
Under generally accepted practice, reciprocal treatment re-
quires each party to afford treatment to the other that is 
equivalent to that which it receives from the other. Reciprocal 
treatment differs from national treatment - the approach adopted 
by the Paris Convention187 - in that national treatment requires a 
party only to accord the same level of treatment to the other party 
as is accorded to its own nationals. 
While Article VI may be subject to varying interpretations, 
and while there appears to be some question as to what was actu-
are considered to be Chinese applicants for purposes of the Chinese Patent Law. As cur-
rently implemented, this provision apparently permits "foreigners holding permanent resi-
dence visas, and foreign entities that have registered offices with actual business operations 
in China" to deal directly with the Patent Office. ZHENG, supra note 10, at 438. Other for-
eign entities must work through Chinese patent agents. Id. 
185. See generally U.S.-China Trade Agreement, supra note 8. 
186. U.S.-China Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. VI(3). 
187. See Economic Contract Law, supra note 99, art. 37. 
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ally intended by the signatories, its wording suggests that each 
party undertook to provide the same benefits to the other as were 
available to it (i.e., reciprocal treatment). Since the intellectual 
property protection available to the Chinese in the United States 
is, for the most part, broader than that available in China, the ar-
gument has been made that the Chinese may be in violation of 
their undertakings under the Agreement.188 
B. Treatment of Trade Secrets in Chinese Law 
China has not adopted a trade secrets law. As a consequence, 
industrial property189 that is not patentable enjoys no statutory 
protection in China. This poses difficulties for U.S. investors. Be-
cause trade secrets are not statutorily defined and there is no stat-
utory prohibition of, or penalty for, the wrongful conversion of 
trade secrets, an investor's sole protection against, and remedy for, 
the wrongful conversion of trade secrets is by contract. In negotiat-
ing contracts involving the transfer of unpatented technology or 
know-how, the U.S. investor must, therefore, take every possible 
step to ensure that his concerns regarding confidentiality are fully 
addressed. 
For example, the contract should identify and bind the end-
user of the technology. Typically, contracts involving technology 
transfer involve governmental agencies that are not actually re-
sponsible for performance. The actual user of the technology -
the entity and its principal employees - should be explicitly iden-
tified in the contract as persons to whom the contractual duty of 
maintaining confidentiality applies. In some cases, it may be possi-
ble to bring these persons into the contract as parties. The end-
user should be made specifically responsible, of course, for the con-
duct of any third parties that will have access to the technology. 
To the extent possible, these entities should also be bound 
contractually. 
The contract should identify with precision the data, informa-
tion and trade secrets to be protected. These may exist in more 
than one form and almost certainly will not all be in tangible form. 
Second-generation data or information gained from operational ex-
perience that is to be protected must also be described with care 
since it may have a direct bearing on the profitability of the 
venture. 
188. In this regard, see Chwang & Thurston, supra note 19, at 153. 
189. See supra note 6. 
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Finally, the contract must specifically identify the remedies 
for breaches of confidentiality agreements. Those remedies should 
be as explicit and as comprehensive as possible. A guarantee of 
payment from senior personnel of the end-user for wrongful disclo-
sure, in addition to similar guarantees from the end-user itself, is 
desirable (but not always obtainable).190 Liquidated damages pro-
visions may be essential. 
Such support as there is elsewhere in Chinese law for the pro-
tection of trade secrets offers only mild comfort that the Chinese 
will afford greater protection of trade secrets in the future. As 
noted previously, the Technology Transfer Regulations, as imple-
mented through the Detailed Rules, clearly contemplate the con-
tractual transfer or licensing of unpatented industrial property, 191 
and the formation of agreements providing for maintaining its con-
fidentiality.192 Yet, the Detailed Rules restrict the scope of such 
agreements by limiting their duration to that of the underlying 
contract except in the case of unspecified "special conditions. "193 
Furthermore, the Detailed Rules actually release the Chinese 
party entirely from such agreements if, "not owing to the recipi-
ent", the industrial property is made public.194 As a practical mat-
ter, therefore, the recipient has little incentive to police the activi-
ties of its employees or subcontractors with respect to the 
protection of trade secrets, since, in many cases, the recipient may 
actually be better off if the trade secrets are released. The poten-
tial for connivance at, if not outright complicity in, the release of 
valuable industrial property is thus significant. 
In these respects, the Detailed Rules are actually more restric-
tive than the Implementing Measures issued in 1985 that they re-
placed. It, therefore, remains essential that the transferor of trade 
secrets or proprietary data take every possible step to protect its 
interests at the contract negotiating stage. 
190. In this regard, see Conroy, supra note 183, at 565. 
191. The second of the six types of contracts to which the Technology Transfer Regula-
tions, through the Detailed Rules, apply is "Contracts for licensing of technical know-how," 
described as: 
[T]hose for provision or impartment of a certain technical knowledge which has not 
been made public and is used for manufacturing a certain product, or applying a 
certain technology, as well as a product design, a technical process, a formula, qual-
ity control and management skills and such technical knowledge has not yet ob-
tained the legal protection of industrial property rights. (emphasis added) 
Detailed Rules, supra note 119, art. 2(2). 
192. Technology Transfer Regulations, supra note 133, art. 7. 
193. Detailed Rules, supra note 146, art. 13. 
194. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
While there remain gaps and gray areas that need to be filled 
and clarified, there is no doubt about China's commitment to be-
coming a full-fledged member of the world trading community and 
to providing a predictable and businesslike investment environ-
ment for foreign investors. China has a strong interest in the trans-
fer of Western technology on terms consistent with its own na-
tional plan, and it is aware of the need to bend internal 
prerogatives to international commercial realities. China's aware-
ness of the concerns of foreign investors for the protection of intel-
lectual property has shown continuous growth, and this has engen-
dered a major effort to conform China's contracting practices and 
its level of intellectual property protection to international norms. 
The development of Chinese law regarding technology transfer 
has been rapid in the recent past. There is reason to expect further 
evolution as foreign investment increases and becomes a more inte-
gral part of the Chinese economy. Given the progress that has been 
made, there is reason to be optimistic that the environment for 
foreign investment will become ever more congenial. 
45
Marcuss and Watson: Technology Transfer in the People's Republic of China: An Assessm
Published by SURFACE, 1989
